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Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application 
of the All-Pay Auction 
By MICHAEL R. BAYE, DAN KOVENOCK, AND CASPER G. DE VRIES* 
Why do politicians frequently "announce" 
that they have narrowed down a set of po- 
tential recipients of a "prize" to a slate of 
finalists?' In general, does the slate of fi- 
nalists comprise the "best" candidates, and 
does the best candidate always win?2 This 
paper provides answers to these questions. 
Our model of the political process is one of 
rent-seeking, which takes the (perhaps 
overly jaded) view that persons with power 
award political prizes on the basis of self- 
interest. 
In a world where a politician can explic- 
itly auction off a prize to the high bidder, 
the standard auction literature can be used 
to analyze political behavior. The justice 
system, however, precludes politicians from 
explicitly selling the prize to the highest 
bidder; thus politicians cannot let it become 
public knowledge that they are in the busi- 
ness of selling political favors. 
An interesting institution has emerged in 
political markets to overcome this con- 
straint: lobbying. Lobbyists make implicit 
payments to the politician, through cam- 
paign contributions or "wining-and-dining." 
If these up-front payments were rebated to 
those failing to receive the prize, it would 
be clear that the politician was selling fa- 
vors. It is natural, therefore, for a political 
institution to arise such that lobbyists "ante 
up" before the prize is awarded, and these 
up-front payments are not refunded to those 
failing to win the prize. This view of lobby- 
ing has a structure isomorphic to the all-pay 
auction, which differs from standard auc- 
tions in one principal respect: all bids are 
forfeited by the bidders. 
Before we describe our model of the lob- 
bying process, it is useful to provide an 
overview of the existing literature and to 
contrast it with the present analysis. The 
case in which more than two lobbyists value 
the prize identically was first analyzed by 
Herve Moulin (1986), who characterizes the 
symmetric equilibrium to the all-pay auc- 
tion. Similar analysis is provided by Arye 
Hillman (1988), who argues that the equilib- 
rium is unique. It turns out, however, that 
the symmetric equilibrium is not unique; in 
fact there is a continuum of equilibria (in 
Baye et al. [1990], we provide a full charac- 
terization of the equilibria.) 
The case in which some lobbyists value 
the prize more than others has been ana- 
lyzed by, among others, Hillman and John 
Riley (1989), who argue that equilibrium 
involves only the top two lobbyists. In this 
Review, Tore Ellingsen (1991) has consid- 
ered the interesting case in which one lob- 
byist values the prize more than n -1 com- 
petitors with common valuations (see his 
proposition 1), and he demonstrates the ex- 
istence of n equilibria. Baye et al. (1990) 
have shown, however, that there actually 
exists a continuum of equilibria in this case. 
Moreover, the expected revenue earned by 
the politician differs across this continuum 
of equilibria; there is not revenue equiva- 
lence across the equilibria. 
The present analysis provides a simple 
closed-form expression for expected rev- 
enues that is valid for all equilibria. Our 
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'The International Olympic Committee, for in- 
stance, selected six cities as "finalists" for the 1996 
Summer Olympics: Belgrade, Manchester, Toronto, 
Melbourne, Athens, and Atlanta. 
2Atlanta won the bid for the 1996 Olympics. 
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technique does not require an explicit calcu- 
lation of the Nash-equilibrium mixed strate- 
gies. Consequently, our results provide a 
framework with which one may reexamine 
the implications of the equilibria missed for 
previous results, without explicitly calculat- 
ing the (uncountable infinity) of equilibria. 
The objective of the present paper is to 
take into account the continuum of equilib- 
ria and to determine the amount of rents 
the politician can expect to earn given such 
a political institution. To answer this ques- 
tion, we model the political process as a 
two-stage game of complete information. In 
stage 1 the politician takes the political in- 
stitution of lobbying as given but is free to 
constrain the process by "narrowing down" 
the slate of candidates to a set of "finalists." 
In stage 2, the finalists compete in an all-pay 
auction: the lobbyist giving the greatest bribe 
wins the prize, while the others receive 
nothing for their payments. We solve this 
decision problem by backwards induction, 
solving first for the Nash-equilibrium pay- 
ments that accrue to the politician in the 
second-stage lobbying game given an arbi- 
trary set of lobbyists. We then solve for the 
optimal first-stage decision of the politician, 
which involves the selection of the set of 
"finalists" that maximizes expected political 
rents. We will show that, under plausible 
circumstances, the politician has a perverse 
incentive to preclude lobbyists most valuing 
the prize from participating in the second- 
stage lobbying game. Intuitively, this pre- 
commitment may take the form of announc- 
ing prior to any lobbying that "five states 
have been selected as finalists for the site of 
a new military base." We will refer to this 
precommitment as the exclusion principle. 
The exclusion principle has obvious implica- 
tions for efficiency; states deriving the great- 
est economic benefit from a military base 
(and hence having the highest valuation of 
the prize) may be excluded a priori from the 
announced set of finalists. 
I. The Model 
Consider a politician who must determine 
which of n > 2 lobbyists will receive a prize. 
The value of the prize to lobbyist i is vi > 0, 
where the vi's are common knowledge and 
ordered such that v1 ? v2 ?> ? * vn. 
The politician does not care which lobby- 
ists wins the prize but does care about how 
much money he has available in his cam- 
paign chest. Accordingly, he decides to 
award the prize to the lobbyist who gives 
him the greatest up-front, nonrefundable 
implicit bribe. The objective of the politi- 
cian is to select a set of lobbyists (the set of 
finalists) that maximizes his expected rents, 
W= En7=lbi, where bi is the bribe paid by 
player i. 
Given a set of "finalists," lobbying is an 
all-pay auction: the payoff to lobbyist i if he 
offers a bribe of bi is vi = vi - bi if bi is the 
highest of all n bribes. However, if some 
other lobbyist offers a higher bribe, lobbyist 
i's payoff is 7i = - bi. We assume that when 
multiple lobbyists submit the highest bribe, 
the prize is awarded to one of them at 
random. Thus, the payoff of lobbyist i is 
given by 
vi -bi if bi > bj V i j 
lvi bi if i ties M - 1 others 
(1) ri(b) {M for high bid 
l - bi if bi < bj for some 
I * i. 
This payoff structure is standard in the lob- 
bying literature (cf. Hillman, 1988). It can 
also be viewed as the limiting case of an 
alternative payoff structure suggested by 
Gordon Tullock (1980) that is also used in 
this literature (see Baye et al., 1989). In 
Section II we characterize the expected 
payments by lobbyists in the second-stage 
lobbying game. These results are used in 
Section III to determine the politician's 
rent-maximizing selection of the set of 
"finalists." 
II. The Lobbying Game 
We first sketch a proof of the nonexis- 
tence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium 
for the all-pay auction. Consider the two- 
player case and suppose (bl, b2) did com- 
prise a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium 
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(without loss of generality, suppose b1 2 b2). 
If b1 < v2, player 2 could deviate to earn a 
higher payoff by increasing b2 slightly above 
b1 to win the prize. If b1l v2, player 2's 
best reply to b1 is zero; but with b2 = 0, it 
pays player 1 to deviate from b1 by lowering 
the bid to (small) E > 0, contradicting the 
hypothesis that b1 2 v2. 
It is known, though, that there does exist 
an equilibrium in mixed strategies, in which 
lobbyists randomize their bribes (cf. Partha 
Dasgupta and Eric Maskin, 1986; Moulin, 
1986; Hillman and Riley, 1989; Baye et al., 
1990). Moreover, with more than two play- 
ers, there generally exists a continuum of 
possible equilibria (Baye et al., 1990). As 
our focus centers around the politician's 
rent-maximizing selection of finalists, we 
need only characterize the expected total 
bribes that accrue in a given Nash equilib- 
rium of the lobbying game. The innovation 
is that the techniques employed below do 
not rely on the algebraic form of the mixed 
strategies used by the lobbyists in equilib- 
rium and, thus, are valid even in the pres- 
ence of a continuum of Nash equilibrium 
mixed strategies. 
The following theorem is the key ingredi- 
ent that enables us to determine the set of 
finalists that maximizes the politician's rents. 
The novelty of the result is that it is valid 
for each equilibrium in the continuum of 
possible Nash equilibria and thus can be 
used for purposes beyond the present pa- 
per. For example, the formula allows one to 
strengthen the results of Ellingsen (1991), 
which are based on a finite subset of equi- 
libria. 
THEOREM 1: Let vl 2 V2 v 2 Vn de- 
note the valuations of lobbyists {1,2,...,n} in 
the stage-2 lobbying game. Let E1b1 denote 
the expected bid of a lobbyist with the highest 
valuation. Then in any Nash equilibrium, 
(2) W=-V2 + 1- Elbl < V2. 
PROOF: 
Let Fi(bi) denote the cumulative distribu- 
tion function of lobbyist i in an arbitrary 
(mixed-strategy) Nash equilibrium, and let 
Si denote the support of the distribution. 
Lobbyist i must earn constant (expected) 
profits almost everywhere (a.e.) in Si, For 
lobbyist 1 this constant must equal v1- v29 
and for lobbyists 2,3,...,n, this constant is 
zero (see Baye et al., 1990).3 Hence, the 
following conditions must hold: 
n 
(3) w1(b)= rHF(b)[vj-bj] 
i?l 
n 
+ [1 - Fi (bl1) ][bl1] 
= V1 - V2 a.e. on S 
and 
n 
(4) wri(bi) = Fj(bi) [vi - bi] 
J ?J] 
[ 1 ,1 H Fj(bi) [bi] = ? 
a.e. on Si, i =#1. 
Let pi(bi) = H> jniFj(bi) denote the probabil- 
ity that lobbyist i wins the prize, conditional 
on his bid and the strategies employed by 
the other n -1 lobbyists in a Nash equilib- 
rium.4 Then, since equations (3) and (4) 
hold almost everywhere in their respective 
supports, taking the expectations of these 
equations and manipulating reveals that 
(5) Piv - Elbl = vl- V2 
and 
(6) Pivi-Eibi=0 Vi#1 
where E denotes the expectation with re- 
spect to lobbyist j's (equilibrium) mixed 
3Note that when lobbyist 2's valuation equals that of 
lobbyist 1, V1 
-2 = 0. 
4We can rule out mass points for any agent at a bid 
b > 0 (see Baye et al., 1990). 
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strategy and Pj Ejpj(bj). Summing over 
equations (5) and (6), we then obtain 
n 
(7) W- EJbI 
j=1 
=(P1-1)Vl+ EPivi+v2. 
Applying the fundamental theorem of inte- 
gral calculus to E>1 Pj, it follows that 
EY =jPi = 1. Furthermore, if v2 > vi, i > 2, 
then Pi = 0 (see Baye et al., 1989, 1990). 
Hence, 
(8) W= (P1-1)v1 + (2-P1)v2. 
Rearranging (5), we find 
v1 -v2 + Elb1 
P =- 
V1 
which, inserted into (8), yields our results. 
I Two implications of Theorem 1 are worth 
noting. First, if two or more players most 
value the prize at some common level, v, 
the expected rents accruing to the politician 
equal v; there is full rent dissipation. Sec- 
ondly, if v1 > v2, then the expected rents 
accruing to the politician are strictly less 
than v2, since E1b, < v2 in any Nash equi- 
librium. In other words, regardless of 
whether there is a unique equilibrium5 or a 
continuum of equilibria,6 in every equilib- 
rium there is underdissipation of rents. In 
the following section, this result will be used 
to establish when it pays a politician to 
preclude some lobbyists from competing in 
the lobbying game. First, however, we state 
the following lemma from Hillman and Ri- 
ley (1989). 
LEMMA 1: Suppose that the valuations of 
the lobbyists in the stage-2 lobbying game are 
such that v1 2 V2 > V3 2 V4 * * Vn. Then in 
the unique Nash equilibrium, Eb1 = V2 /2. 
Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 together imply 
that, when two players value the prize 
strictly more than all other players, the ex- 
pected rents accruing to the politician in the 
stage-2 lobbying game are 
(9) W(Vl,V2) 1 V2 ]2 
Note that, when v1 > V2 > V3, expected rents 
are increasing in v2 but decreasing in v1. 
Intuitively, as player l's valuation increases, 
the playing field becomes more unequal. 
Hence, player 2 reduces his expected pay- 
ment to the politician, and total expected 
rents decline. 
It is important to note that the formula in 
equation (9) is based on specific configura- 
tions of valuations and does not hold in 
general (it does not hold when v1 > v2 = V3). 
The reason is that, when v1 > V2 = V3, Eb1 
in equation (2) varies depending upon which 
of the continuum of equilibria is played, 
and thus, the politician's expected rents de- 
pend upon which equilibrium the lobbyists 
play. This point has not been addressed in 
the existing literature, and it plays a crucial 
role in our analysis. 
III. Selecting the Finalists 
Since there exists a continuum of ex- 
pected political rents for some config- 
urations of valuations, our next task is to 
characterize properties of the maximum ex- 
pected political rents that can be extracted 
from the lobbyists. 
PROPOSITION 1: If ...,m} is a rent- 
maximizing set of finalists (with valuations 
vi > ... * v ), then expected rents are 
(10) ( ( V A 
PROOF: 
We must show that if {i,..., mA} is a set of 
finalists that maximizes expected rents (and 
the corresponding valuations are v 1 2 ... > 
5The equilibrium is unique when V2 > V3. 
6There is a continuum of equilibria when V2= V3. 
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vm), then expected rents are W(v1, v2). This 
is clearly true if m = 2; hence, suppose m > 
2. If v? = - v, equation (2) reveals that 
W= v = W(1v1,132). If V V2> V3, equation 
(9) shows again that W = W(v?, v2). Finally, 
if Vi > V2 = V3 - VIexpected rents increase 
by excluding player 1, since by Theorem 1 
W(v1, V2) < V2 = W(V2 N3). However, this 
contradicts the hypothesis that the set 
{1,.. , m) maximizes expected rents. Hence, 
we conclude that any rent-maximizing set of 
finalists generates expected rents of 
W(A1, V2)A 
Thus, while equation (9) does not hold 
for all possible configurations of values, it 
does hold when the set of finalists is se- 
lected so as to maximize expected rents 
[equation (10)]. This result allows us to de- 
termine the set of finalists that maximizes 
the politician's expected rents. Specifically, 
since equation (10) is decreasing in the 
highest valuation and increasing in the 
second-highest valuation, it never pays to 
exclude a player with a valuation that lies 
between the valuations of any two lobbyists 
who are in the set of finalists. Thus, the 
expected rent-maximizing set of finalists is 
determined by considering all pairwise com- 
binations of adjacent lobbyists until lobby- 
ists k and k + 1 are found such that 
W(Vk,Vk+l) = max W(vi,vi+1) 
To realize these rents, the politician must 
exclude players with valuations greater than 
vk from the set of finalists. Formally, we 
have shown the following: 
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose v,? V2  V3 ? 
*. * 2Vn. Then the politician maximizes ex- 
pected rents by constructing a set of finalists 
that excludes lobbyists with valuations strictly 
greater than Vk' where k is such that 
( 
Vk )2 ( v) 2 vi 
In order to highlight the implications of 
our results, consider the following two 
corollaries. 
COROLLARY 1: Suppose v1 = V2 2 V3 ... 
> vn Then the politician does not gain by 
constructing an agenda that excludes some 
lobbyists from the lobbying game. 
COROLLARY 2: Suppose v1 > V2 = V3 2 
* * vn. Then the politician maximizes ex- 
pected rents by excluding the lobbyist with the 
highest valuation from the set of finalists. 
It may also be optimal for a politician to 
exclude more than one lobbyist from the 
stage-2 game. For instance, suppose v1> 
V2> V3 = V4 2 * * Vn,. Then the politician 
maximizes expected rents by constructing an 
agenda that excludes lobbyists 1 and 2 from 
the set of finalists whenever 
(1+ i2<V3 
These results demonstrate the exclusion 
principle: a politician may benefit from pre- 
cluding the lobbyists valuing the prize the 
most from participating in the lobbying pro- 
cess. 
We conclude with a numerical example 
to aid in elucidating our findings. Suppose 
v1 = 50, v2 = 40, and v3 = 38. The theorem 
and lemma imply that the politician earns 
W = 36 if he does not constrain the lobbying 
process or limits lobbying to only players 1 
and 2. However, if the politician announces 
that players 2 and 3 are the finalists, then 
the expected payments to the politician are 
W(40, 38) = 37.05. Thus it pays the politician 
to exclude lobbyist 1, who values most the 
prize, from participating in the lobbying 
game. 
IV. Conclusions 
This paper has examined an interesting 
principle arising in all-pay auctions: the ex- 
clusion principle. This principle states that a 
politician wishing to maximize political rents 
may find it in his best interest to exclude 
certain lobbyists from participating in the 
lobbying process-particularly lobbyists 
valuing most the political prize. In addition 
to pointing out the exclusion principle, our 
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Theorem 1 characterizes expected revenue 
for the entire continuum of equilibria that 
can arise in n > 2-player all-pay auctions 
with arbitrary valuations of the prize. This is 
in contrast to the results of Ellingsen (1991), 
Hillman (1988), Hillman and Riley (1989), 
and Hillman and Dov Samet (1987), among 
others, which are valid only for a subset of 
possible equilibria. 
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